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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Torrey Friedrich appeals from his judgment of conviction in two cases, one for 
DUI and the other for grand theft. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress in the DUI case, and abused its discretion by imposing excessive 
sentences in both cases. The State's response in regard to the excessive sentencing 
claims is not remarkable, and so this reply is only necessary to address the motion to 
suppress in the DUI case. 
The State made two concessions in regard to the motion to suppress argument: 
first, that the officer initiated the detention when he activated his overhead lights as he 
pulled in behind the suspect vehicle; second, that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion based on the fact that the vehicle fishtailed on the slick roadway because it is 
not challenging the district court's finding that the vehicle was being driven reasonably, 
given the conditions. The State's only contention, therefore, is that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop because he was able to determine that 
Mr. Friedrich was driving even though his license was suspended. However, at the 
moment the officer initiated the traffic stop, by his own admission, he had not been able 
to identify the suspect vehicle as Mr. Friedrich's, nor had he been able to identify 
the driver of the suspect vehicle. As such, the officer did not possess reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Friedrich was driving without a valid license, and the evidence 
uncovered thereafter should have been suppressed. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in ML Friedrich's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Friedrich's motion to suppress 
because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the warrantless 
detention of Mr. Friedrich. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Friedrich's Motion To 
Suppress Because The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To 
Justify The Warrantless Detention Of Mr. Friedrich 
A. Introduction 
Based on the State's concessions and the officer's admissions, the evidence 
demonstrates that Officer Moore did not have an objectively reasonable suspicion to 
detain the suspect vehicle at the moment he initiated the detention. Therefore, the 
evidence discovered thereafter, which led to the DUI charge, should have been 
suppressed. This Court should reverse the district court's decision denying 
Mr. Friedrich's motion to suppress and remand his case for further proceedings. 
B. In Light Of The State's Concessions, It Is Clear That The Officer Did Not Have 
Reasonable Suspicion That The Vehicle Belonged To Or Was Being Driven By 
Mr. Friedrich At The Time He Initiated The Detention, Meaning The 
Subsequently-Discovered Evidence Should Have Been Suppressed 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Friedrich pointed out that Officer Moore could not 
have gained reasonable suspicion of criminal activity from the fishtailing of the car 
because the district court found that the car was being driven reasonably, given the 
weather conditions on the night in question. (App. Br., pp.13-14.) The State is not 
challenging that conclusion, and thus, concedes that the officer did not gain reasonable 
suspicion from that event. (See Resp. Br., p.8 n.2.) Mr. Friedrich also contended that 
the detention began when Officer Moore activated his overhead lights as he pulled in 
behind the suspect vehicle. (App. Br., pp.12-13.) The State also concedes that the 
detention began at that moment. (Resp. Br., p.7 n.1.) As a result of these two 
4 
concessions, the State's only contention is that Officer Moore had reasonable suspicion 
that Mr. Friedrich was driving the suspect vehicle and that he was doing so even though 
his license was suspended. (See Resp. Br., pp.6-9.) 
However, Officer Moore's own testimony reveals that he did not have an 
objectively reasonable suspicion that Mr. Friedrich was driving the vehicle. In fact, 
Officer Moore admitted that he did not even know it was Mr. Friedrich's vehicle until 
after he pulled in behind the vehicle (i.e., after he initiated the detention of the vehicle). 
Reasonable suspicion must be based on the information known to the officer "at or 
before the time of the stop." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). An officer's 
subjective feelings are irrelevant to this determination, as it is based on an objective 
assessment of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 8.19. Reasonable suspicion 
requires more than a mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id. at 
811 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 239 (1990) (in turn quoting United States 
v. Sako/ow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989))). The record in this case is clear: Officer Moore did 
not have an objectively reasonable suspicion at the moment he initiated the detention, 
and so that detention was illegal. 
For example, Officer Moore admitted that he was unable to identify the subject 
vehicle by sight. (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-12). In fact, he admitted that all he could see were the 
headlights and turn signal lights on the suspect vehicle. (Tr., p.23, Ls.4-6.) He also 
admitted that he did not confirm the vehicle's license plate number before initiating the 
detention. (Tr., p.30, Ls.17-21.) Furthermore, Officer Moore admitted, "I didn't know, 
you know, which driveway that vehicle pulled into, but I know Mr. Friedrich lived in that 
general area, within one or two houses of where the vehicle turned in." (Tr. p.30, 
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Ls.1-9.) And, critically, Officer Moore also admitted that he could not identify the driver 
of the suspect vehicle before he initiated the detention. (Tr., p.23, Ls.7-10.) Rather, 
Officer Moore admitted that he was only able to identify the driver after he initiated the 
stop and activated his spotlight (Tr., p.31, Ls.10-17.) 
Therefore, by the officer's own admissions, the totality of the information known 
to Officer Moore at the time he initiated the detention fails to show a reasonable 
suspicion, but rather, demonstrates that he only had a hunch. The only information him 
had at or before the time of the detention (when he activated his emergency lights) was 
that a vehicle which, through the nighttime snowstorm, appeared of similar make and 
model to Mr. Friedrich's car, was in a driveway near to where Mr. Friedrich lived. (Tr., 
p.30, Ls.1-9 (Officer Moore admitting that he was not sure into which driveway the 
suspect vehicle had pulled); Tr., p.39, L.13 (describing the weather as "snowy and 
terrible"); Tr., p.23, L.5 ("it was dark out" when Officer Moore saw the suspect vehicle).) 
As such, Officer Moore only possessed a hunch that the vehicle belonged to 
Mr. Friedrich, much less that Mr. Friedrich was driving, when he initiated the detention. 1 
Therefore, since, at the moment the officer initiated the detention, he only had a hunch, 
not a reasonable suspicion, of criminal activity, the evidence discovered thereafter 
should have been suppressed. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
1 Based on the information the officer admitted to having and not having, it equally as 
likely that the vehicle was being driven by one of Mr. Friedrich's friends or that it was 
being driven by an entirely innocent person lost in the snow storm. It was only a lucky 
guess on Officer Moore's part (evident by his own admissions) that Mr. Friedrich was 
the driver of the suspect vehicle. "For officers to base a search, even in part, on a 'pop' 
guess ... stretches the concept of reasonable suspicion beyond recognition .... " 
Sako/ow, 490 U.S. at 16. As such, the decision to deny the motion to suppress was in 
error. 
6 
484 (1963); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821; State v. Limberhand, 117 Idaho 456, 461 (Ct. 
App. 1990). Thus, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying the 
motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive 
Sentences On Mr. Friedrich In The Two Cases On Appeal 
Because the State's argument concerning the excessiveness of Mr. Friedrich's 
sentence is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Friedrich 
simply refers the Court back to pages 17-21 of his Appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Friedrich respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
decision to deny his motion to suppress and remand that case for further proceedings. 
Otherwise, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems 
appropriate, or alternatively, vacate those sentences and remand to the district court for 
a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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